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CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES RESEARCH LAB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL

ISSUE:
After the 1991 Gulf War ended, the Shiite population in southern Iraq and the
Kurdish population in northern Iraq revolted against the Iraqi government. In
response, the Iraqi Government committed or allegedly committed the following five
acts against the Shiites and Kurds:
1) Iraqi government officials dropped pamphlets into major Iraqi cities in the south
directing all non-combatants to leave the cities and travel north. Iraqi helicopter
gunships repeatedly strafed, bombed, attacked and killed civilians who (as
directed) travelled north.
2) Iraqi troops deliberately attacked mosques which were located in Karbala. At the
time of these deliberate attacks, imams from these mosques were providing
medical treatment and shelter to injured civilians and insurgents.
3) Iraqi troops entered hospitals in Basrah and Karbala and summarily murdered any
males between the age of 12 and 70. Iraqi troops also murdered, tortured, and
raped medical personnel who had provided treatment to insurgents.
4) Ali Hassan Al Majid rounded up male civilians (of fighting age) and ordered them
to drink petrol. After these men drank the petrol, Al Majid ordered his troops to
fire or personally fired himself tracer bullets into the victims so that the petrol
would ignite and the victim would explode. This tactic was used to intimidate
people into offering information about insurgent activities.
5) Taha Yassin Ramadan allegedly ordered the Iraqi Air Force to load planes with
bombs containing sarin nerve gas. These planes allegedly flew to Karbala and
released their payloads over the city. The bombs did not detonate and no sarin
was released into the city.
Do any of these incidents constitute crimes within the jurisdiction of the Iraqi High
Tribunal?

Prepared by Emily J. Peters
Spring 2006
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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
i. Issue1

The Iraqi High Tribunal (“IHT”) has jurisdiction over every natural person,
whether Iraqi or non-Iraqi, who is a resident of Iraq and is accused of the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or violations of certain Iraqi national
laws committed between July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003 in the Republic of Iraq or
elsewhere.2 After the 1991 Gulf War ended, the Shiite population in southern Iraq and
the Kurdish population in northern Iraq revolted against the Iraqi government. In
response, the Iraqi government unleashed a series of violent attacks against the Shiites
and Kurds. This memorandum examines five specific attacks against the Shiite and
Kurdish populations. Four of these attacks are confirmed to be true and one attack is
alleged. The focus of analysis is on whether or not the former Iraqi Government’s
actions against the Shiites and Kurds constitute crimes within the jurisdiction of the IHT.

1

ISSUES: After the 1991 Gulf War ended, the Shiite population in southern Iraq and the Kurdish
population in northern Iraq revolted against the Iraqi government. In response, the Iraqi Government
committed or allegedly committed the following five acts against the Shiites and Kurds: (1) Iraqi
government officials dropped pamphlets into major Iraqi cities in the south directing all non-combatants to
leave the cities and travel north. Iraqi helicopter gunships repeatedly strafed, bombed, attacked and killed
civilians who (as directed) travelled north; (2) Iraqi troops deliberately attacked mosques which were
located in Karbala. At the time of these deliberate attacks, imams from these mosques were providing
medical treatment and shelter to injured civilians and insurgents; (3) Iraqi troops entered hospitals in
Basrah and Karbala and summarily murdered any males between the age of 12 and 70. Iraqi troops also
murdered, tortured, and raped medical personnel who had provided treatment to insurgents; (4) Ali Hassan
Al Majid rounded up male civilians (of fighting age) and ordered them to drink petrol. After these men
drank the petrol, Al Majid ordered his troops to fire or personally fired himself tracer bullets into the
victims so that the petrol would ignite and the victim would explode. This tactic was used to intimidate
people into offering information about insurgent activities; and (5) Taha Yassin Ramadan allegedly ordered
the Iraqi Air Force to load planes with bombs containing sarin nerve gas. These planes allegedly flew to
Karbala and released their payloads over the city. The bombs did not detonate and no sarin was released
into the city. Do any of these incidents constitute crimes within the jurisdiction of the Iraqi High Tribunal?
(Issue sent via email from Eric Blinderman) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
2

See Statute of The Iraqi High Tribunal, August 11, 2005 [hereinafter IHT Statute] [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

ii. Summary of Conclusions As A Result of the Above-Listed
Acts:
1. Members of the former regime can be tried by the Iraqi
High Tribunal under Article 11 of the IHT Statute for
the crime of genocide.
The IHT has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide under Article 11 of the IHT
Statute.3 For the purposes of the IHT and in accordance with the International
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the crime of Genocide (“Genocide
Convention”), “genocide” means a prohibited act committed with the intent to abolish, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.4 In order to prove the crime
of genocide, three elements must be established: (1) a prohibited act listed in Article 11;
(2) committed against a protected group; and (3) with the intent to abolish, in whole or in
part, that protected group.
Four out of the five above-described episodes of violence against the Shiite and
Kurdish populations clearly satisfy the elements of genocide. The exception is the fifth
episode in which the Iraqi Air Force allegedly released sarin nerve gas into the city of
Karbala. All four of the episodes that qualify as the crime of genocide contain the
prohibited act of either killing or inflicting serious bodily harm. The second element of
genocide is also satisfied because the Shiite and Kurdish populations qualify as ethnic
groups. Finally, the facts support the intent to abolish these protected groups. The fact
that the Iraqi government deliberately attacked cities dominated by Shiite and Kurdish
civilians signifies intent to destroy these protected groups.

3

See IHT Statute, supra note 2, art. 11 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

4

Id.

2. Members of the former regime can be tried by the Iraqi
High Tribunal under Article 12 of the IHT Statute for
crimes against humanity.
The IHT has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity under Article 12 of the
IHT Statute.5 For the purposes of the IHT, “crimes against humanity” means a prohibited
act committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack.6 In order to prove crimes against humanity,
four elements must be established: (1) a prohibited act listed in Article 12; (2) committed
against civilians; (3) as part of a widespread or systematic attack; and (4) the perpetrator
must have knowledge of the attack.
Four of the five of the above-described cases against the Shiite and Kurdish
populations qualify as crimes against humanity. Four of the attacks satisfy the first
element of a prohibited act either in the form of murder, forcible transfer of population,
torture, rape, or other inhumane acts causing great suffering to mental or physical health.
The second element, that the prohibited acts be committed against civilians, is clearly
satisfied as all of the attacks were committed against Shiite and Kurdish civilians. From
a collective perspective, the fact that multiple attacks were directed against the Shiites
and Kurds resulting in thousands of civilian deaths indicates that the attacks were
widespread or systematic, thus satisfying the third element. Finally, the perpetrators
likely had the mens rea required by the fourth element. The fact that Iraqi military
resources were being used to perform these attacks against the Shiites and Kurds
indicates that all persons who ordered or committed the attacks knew or should have
5

Id. at art. 12.

6

Id.

known of a plan to kill and harm the Shiite and Kurdish populations.
3. Members of the former regime can be tried by the Iraqi
High Tribunal under Article 13 of the IHT Statute for
war crimes, if there is proof that an ‘armed conflict’
was in progress at the time of the attack.
The IHT has jurisdiction over war crimes under Article 13 of the IHT Statute.7
For purposes of the IHT and in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1949, “war
crimes” means a prohibited act committed during an armed conflict with a nexus between
the prohibited act and the armed conflict.8 In order to prove war crimes, three elements
must be established: (1) a prohibited act listed in Article 13; (2) committed during an
internal or international armed conflict; (3) with an obvious connection between the
prohibited act and the armed conflict.
Only one of the five cases of violence against the Shiites and Kurds indicates that
an armed conflict was taking place at the time of the prohibited act. In episode five, the
Iraqi Air Force attempted to release sarin nerve gas into the city of Karbala. However,
the sarin bombs did not detonate, so no gas was released into the city. This episode may
qualify as a prohibited act intentionally directed against the civilian population during an
internal armed conflict. The Iraqi government could argue; however, that no attack
actually occurred since the bombs did not detonate. The other four episodes do not
mention an internal armed conflict, and no international armed conflict was taking place
at that time. The Gulf War ended prior to these attacks. If it can be proven in any of the
five episodes of violence against the Shiites and Kurds that the prohibited acts were in
7

Id. at art. 13.

8

Id.

connection with an internal or international armed conflict, then the elements of war
crimes could be proven.
4. Members of the former regime cannot be tried by the
Iraqi High Tribunal under Article 14 of the IHT Statute
for violations of stipulated Iraqi national laws.
The IHT has jurisdiction over violations of certain Iraqi national laws under
Article 14 of the IHT Statute.9 For purposes of the IHT and in accordance with Iraqi
national law, four crimes are stipulated as within the jurisdiction of the IHT. These
crimes include: (1) tampering with the judiciary; (2) wasting national resources; (3) abuse
of position and pursuit of policies that were about to lead to war with an Arab country;
and (4) default in the elements of Articles 11-13 that are proved to constitute a crime
punishable by the penal law of Iraq.10 The facts from the five specific cases of violence
against the Shiite and Kurdish populations do not indicate any violations of the stipulated
Iraqi national laws. Thus, no one involved in these five episodes of violence against the
Shiites and Kurds should be tried for violations of Iraqi laws.
5. Members of the former regime can be tried by the Iraqi
High Tribunal Under Article 15 of the IHT if they
committed, ordered, solicited, induced, aided, abetted,
contributed to, or attempted to commit a crime within
the jurisdiction of the IHT.
The IHT has jurisdiction over the crimes outlined in Articles 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the
IHT Statute; however, these articles do not specify who bears the criminal responsibility.
Article 15 of the IHT Statute defines the individual criminal responsibility for crimes

9

Id. at art. 14.
Id.

10

committed within the jurisdiction of the IHT.11 For purposes of the IHT, anyone who
committed, ordered, solicited, induced, aided, abetted, contributed to, or attempted to
commit a crime within the jurisdiction of the IHT shall be personally responsible and
liable for punishment.12 Furthermore, Article 15 states that any person in the Iraqi
government, including leaders in official positions, can be held liable.13 Finally, Article
15 incorporates the doctrine of ‘superior responsibility’ into the IHT Statute, which
makes superior government officials responsible for crimes committed by subordinates
and vice versa.14
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND15
i. Historical Context.

Throughout 1991, Iraq was under an international public microscope. A welcome
result of this process was increased public awareness of the deplorable state of human
rights in Iraq. Iraq was a seemingly impenetrable one-party state where, until its invasion
of Kuwait in August 1990, human rights abuses largely escaped scrutiny and
international condemnation. Early in 1991, world attention focused on the Iraqi
government’s suppression of the Shiite revolt in the south and the Kurdish revolt in the
north. This tragedy, when Saddam Hussein's forces massacred thousands in putting

11

Id. at art. 15.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Human Rights Watch/Middle East, REPORT ON IRAQ AND OCCUPIED KUWAIT (1992)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

down the revolts and when nearly two million were forced to flee their homes, produced
some of the most extensive and severe violations of human rights.

ii. The 1991 Uprisings In Iraq.

In the immediate wake of Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, a new human rights
crisis unfolded, this time in war-ravaged Iraq itself. Residents of at least two dozen
predominantly Shiite southern Iraqi cities rose up against the government in early March
1991, ousting government forces from nearly all of those cities. Similar rebellions broke
out within days throughout the predominantly Kurdish north of the country.

In their counterattack, Iraqi government troops killed thousands of unarmed Shiite
and Kurdish civilians by firing indiscriminately into residential areas; executing people
on the streets and in homes and hospitals; rounding up persons, especially young men,
during house-to-house searches, and arresting them without charge or shooting them in
masses; and targeting fire from attack helicopters on unarmed civilians as they fled the
cities.

No reliable figures are available concerning the number of persons killed or
wounded by either side during the uprising, and Iraqi authorities have never released such
statistics. However, one journalist reported from Iraq in early 1991 that the government
"has forbidden Shiites from displaying traditional signs of mourning such as black flags
and paper streamers printed with the names of the dead, because it would enable visitors
to count the numbers of Shiite martyrs.'" Senior Arab diplomats told the London-based
Arabic daily newspaper al-Hayat in October 1991 that Iraqi leaders were privately

acknowledging that 250,000 people were killed during the uprisings, with most of the
casualties in the south.16 Independent investigation to verify this figure was not possible,
nor was it possible to determine how many of the casualties were noncombatants.

The turmoil began in Basra on March 1, 1991 one day after the cease-fire in
Kuwait, and spread within days to Karbala, Najaf, Hilla, Nasiriyya, al-Amara and other
mostly Shiite cities of southern Iraq. The rebellion in the north began on or about March
5, 1991. By March 21, Kurdish insurgents controlled every major city in the north or
Iraq.

The rebellions followed a general pattern. On the day of a city's uprising, rebels
and masses of civilians ousted government forces from their headquarters, prisons and
barracks, killing or capturing them or forcing them to flee. The revolts were aided by
soldiers who either switched sides or deserted, as well as by some degree of planning
during the preceding weeks and months by underground opposition groups.17 However,
the outpouring of popular support for the uprising was largely spontaneous. It was fueled
by anger at government repression and the devastation wrought by two wars in a decade,
and a perception that Iraqi security forces were uniquely vulnerable after being crushed
by the U.S.-led forces in Operation Desert Storm.

17

Jonathan Randal, Kurdish Uprising Aided by Clandestine Army Contacts, Wash. Post, March 23, 1991,
at A1 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

The rebels then controlled the "liberated" cities for a number of days, while
government troops, primarily the elite Republican Guard, regrouped outside the city
limits and began shelling the city from tanks and firing missiles and automatic fire from
helicopters. Although the fire was sometimes directed at suspected rebel strongholds,
little effort was made to limit civilian casualties, and often civilians were directly
targeted.

The rebels were unable to resist for long. The army, and particularly the
Republican Guard, largely remained loyal to Saddam Hussein. Their counteroffensive
was buoyed by the failure of the U.S.-led alliance to prevent Iraqi use of helicopter
gunships. Meanwhile, the rebels had little experience defending captured territory and
were armed only with rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and a few heavier weapons
captured from government forces. As the government forces closed in on the uprisings,
over 1.5 million Iraqis escaped from the strife-torn cities during March and April 1991,
crossing into Turkey and Iran, or fleeing into zones controlled by Kurdish rebels in the
north or into the marshes in the south, beyond the reach of government forces.

The Shiite and Kurdish exodus was sudden and chaotic, with thousands fleeing on
foot, on donkeys, or crammed onto open-backed trucks and tractors. Many, including
children, died or suffered injury along the way, primarily from adverse weather,
unhygienic conditions, and insufficient food and medical care. Some were killed by army
helicopters, which deliberately strafed columns of fleeing civilians in a number of
incidents in both the north and south. Others were injured when they stepped on mines

that had been planted by Iraqi troops near the eastern border during the war with Iran, and
in rural areas from which the government had forcibly relocated Kurds during the 1980s.

After bombarding a rebel-held city from afar, Iraqi tanks and infantrymen
recaptured city after city, until they were back in control of all Shiite and Kurdish cities.
Upon regaining control, Iraqi troops engaged in wide scale looting and atrocities against
the civilian population. The violence was heaviest in the south, where a smaller portion of
the local population had fled than in Kurdish areas, owing partly to the danger of
escaping through the south's flat, exposed terrain. Those who remained in the south were
at the mercy of advancing government troops, who went through neighborhoods, firing
indiscriminately and summarily executing hundreds of young men.

Refugees alleged to Middle East Watch and others that Iraqi helicopters dropped a
variety of chemical ordnance on civilians, including napalm and phosphorus bombs,
chemical agents and sulfuric acid. Representatives of human rights and humanitarian
organizations who saw refugees with burn injuries or photographs of such injuries were
unable to confirm the source of these burns. However, doctors who examined wounded
Iraqis said that some of their burns were consistent with the use of napalm.

iii. Eyewitness Reports.

What follows is a description of human rights abuses committed during March
1991 in the predominantly Shiite cities of Southern Iraq. This information was drawn
primarily from interviews conducted by Middle East Watch with Iraqi refugees in Iran,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and London, as well as from press accounts.

Karbala is the major Shiite city in southern Iraq which was most devastated
during and after the uprisings. The rebellion in Karbala began on March 5, 1991 when
lightly armed rebels, joined by thousands of civilians, attacked government buildings.
The Shiite insurgents had achieved full control of the city by the next morning.

Within one day, Iraqi government tanks and helicopters began pounding the city
with indiscriminate fire. When army troops entered the city they encountered fierce
resistance by the insurgents. There were fierce battles at al-Husseini hospital, which was
used to treat wounded rebels. A physician from Karbala who fled to Iran told Middle East
Watch:

The hospital was run by the rebels. Doctors there treated the wounded;
people donated blood and whatever medicine they had at home. The army,
when it attacked, concentrated its artillery on the hospital. When they
invaded, they rounded up doctors and nurses, tied their hands and
blindfolded them. They were later released, only to be rounded up again
later and killed. The rebels put up strong resistance in defending the
hospital.

The shrines of Abbas and Hussein, which became the city's rebel headquarters,
were heavily damaged by artillery fire and by rockets fired from helicopters between
March 7 and 11, 1991. Further damage occurred when Iraqi troops burst into the shrines,
in which rebels and civilian sympathizers had barricaded themselves. Hundreds of rebels
and their supporters are said to have died during the siege, either from the artillery and
rocket fire, or from the gunfire of the invading troops.

When Iraqi security forces established control of Karbala again on about March
19, they took vengeance on both rebels and civilians who had not fled the city. The troops

moved from district to district, rounding up young men suspected of being rebels,
shooting some of them on the spot and executing others in large groups. In both Najaf
and Karbala, there were reports that Shiite clerics who walked on the streets were shot on
sight, and that young men were "systematically collected," taken to stadiums, and never
seen again. Summary killings occurred "in a manner that made a point," one Iraqi Shiite
told Middle East Watch. John Simpson, foreign affairs editor of the British Broadcasting
Corporation, wrote about the Iraqi authorities' round-up of the clerics. He visited Najaf
in late April 1991, and found the city's center deserted: "Thousands of Shiite clerics have
been rounded up in Najaf and Karbala and disappeared," he wrote. "Normally the streets
would be full of them. Not now."

Civilians fleeing Najaf and Karbala were strafed by helicopters as they traveled
on the road between the two cities. A refugee from Najaf who was interviewed by Middle
East Watch in Iran on March 17, 1991, stated that "People were told on the loudspeakers
to evacuate the city, for their own safety, within 24 hours and head north, in the direction
of Karbala. When thousands of people had gathered in the northern outskirts of the
city…mostly women and children, helicopters opened fire from machine guns at them.
Between 250 and 300 were killed."

Iraqis who fled to U.S.-controlled Safwan in southern Iraq came with reports of
executions in Basra as late as May 1991. The Washington Post reported that, according to
refugees, "Iraqi troops are still seizing rebels, and civilians with any rebel links, after
extracting confessions from friends and neighbors."18 A teacher told The Post: "They
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John Arundel, Refugees Say Saddam Is Still Killing Foes, Wash. Post, May 10, 1991, at A28.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6].

shoot them and throw their bodies in the street to make people scared of doing anything."
A truck driver claimed: "They used an execution squad right in the main square. They
would blindfold their victims and then shoot them, just leaving the bodies there." One
refugee said that the authorities were "torturing people into giving the names of people
who are involved in rebel fighting."19 The Post reported from Baghdad in May 1991 that
the city was "rife with talk that thousands of southern Shiite Muslims suspected of rebel
sympathies during the anti-regime uprisings last March have been summarily tried and
executed recently."20

III.

DO ANY OF THE FIVE INCIDENTS CONSTITUTE CRIMES
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE IHT?

The IHT is an independent court with limited jurisdiction. It was established to try
crimes committed by members of Saddam Hussein’s former regime between 1968 and
2003.21 Specifically, IHT jurisdiction has been limited to cases involving (1) genocide,22
(2) crimes against humanity,23 (3) war crimes,24 and (4) stipulated national laws.25 The
IHT can hear a case only if it falls into one of these categories. Iraqi federal courts

19

20
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Id.
Id.
See IHT Statute, supra note 2, art. 1 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
Id. at art. 11.
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Id. at art. 12.

24

Id. at art. 13.

25

Id. at art. 14.

handle all other crimes occurring in Iraq which do not fall into one of these
aforementioned categories.26

i. Article 11 – Genocide
The IHT has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide under Article 11 of the IHT
Statute. For the purposes of the IHT “genocide” means:
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
1. Killing members of the group
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.27
This definition of genocide is in accordance with the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, dated December 9, 1948
(“Genocide Convention”),28 which was ratified by Iraq on January 20, 1959.29 The IHT
has jurisdiction to hear cases involving genocide based on interpretations of the Genocide
Convention. According to the Genocide Convention, the crime of genocide has three
elements: (1) One or more prohibited acts, (2) against members of a protected group, (3)
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committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the protected group.30 The first
two elements are the actus reas, or physical act of the crime.31 The third element is the
mens rea, or requisite mental state of the crime.32 All three elements must be proved in
order to establish the crime of genocide.
Since its ratification in 1948, the Genocide Convention had not been applied until
the 1998 prosecution of Jean-Paul Akayesu at the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (“ICTR”). The ICTR convicted Akayesu of genocide, marking the first
genocide trial in an international tribunal.33 Since the Akayesu case, the ICTR has
successfully prosecuted others, to include Kayishema, Ruziindana, and Rutaganda, for
the crime of genocide. While both the ICTR and ICTY have handed down convictions
for genocide, very few courts have actually charged defendants with this crime. In fact,
the recent charges that the IHT brought against Saddam Hussein marks the first time a
Middle Eastern ruler has been charged with the crime of genocide.34

1. Did the perpetrators commit one or more prohibited
acts?
In four out of the five listed cases, the first element is easily satisfied. Article 11
of the IHT lists “killing members of the group” as the first prohibited act. There is
30
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evidence in the first four fact patterns that the Iraqi government murdered thousands of
Shiite and Kurdish civilians. The first episode clearly satisfies the prohibited act of
“killing members of the group.” Iraqi helicopters repeatedly attacked Shiites who, as
directed by the Iraqi government, migrated north. The second episode likely satisfies the
prohibited acts of “killing members of the group” and “causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group.” Iraqi troops deliberately attacked Shiite mosques, which
were being used to shelter injured Shiite civilians and insurgents. It is reasonable to
assume that Shiites hiding inside the mosques at the time of the attacks either died or
suffered serious injuries. Further facts would likely confirm both injuries and casualties.
The third episode clearly counts as the prohibited act of “killing members of the group.”
When Iraqi soldiers retook the southern Shiite towns of Basrah and Karbala they entered
hospitals and murdered Shiite men. The fourth episode also satisfies the prohibited act of
“killing members of the group.” Ali Hassan Al Majid and his troops forced civilians of
fighting age to drink petrol. Al Majid and his soldiers would then fire tracer bullets into
the victims causing them to explode. The fifth and final episode is the only fact pattern
that does not clearly satisfy the first element of genocide. The attempted use of chemical
weapons over a large city during an internal armed conflict does not easily count as one
of the prohibited acts listed under the first element of genocide, since no deaths occurred.
However, an argument could be made that the attempted use of chemical weapons over a
large city caused “serious mental harm to members of the group.” However, this
argument is not a strong point in light of the convincing evidence in episodes one through
four. In sum, four out of the five cases at hand clearly satisfy the first element of
genocide.

2. Were the acts committed against members of a
protected group?
The next element of genocide requires that the abovementioned prohibited acts be
committed “against members of a protected group.”35 Both the IHT Statute and the
Genocide Convention clearly state that protected groups are “national, ethnical, racial or
religious group[s].”36 The Trial Chamber of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”) was the first court to define protected group status: “It appears that the crime of
genocide was allegedly perceived as targeting only ‘stable’ groups, constituted in a
permanent fashion and membership of which is determined by birth, with the exclusion
of the more ‘mobile’ groups which one joins through individual voluntary
commitment.”37 The ICTR created a fifth category of protected group: stable groups
where membership is determined by birth. To reach this conclusion, the Akayesu court
reasoned that according to the travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Convention, the
intention of the drafters was to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent group.
Not just the four groups listed (national, ethnical, racial, or religious).38
The ICTR has most recently adopted a purely subjective approach, noting that an
ethnic group could be "a group identified as such by others, including perpetrators of the
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crimes."39 In Rutaganda, the ICTR held that the “concepts of national, ethnical, racial
and religious groups have been researched extensively and . . . at present, there are no
generally and internationally accepted precise definitions thereof. Each of these concepts
must be assessed in the light of a particular political, social, and cultural context.”40
According to Rutaganda, one must determine whether or not a group is protected by the
Convention on a case-by-case analysis of the facts and circumstances. The ambiguity of
the terms ethnic, racial, religious and national favors the cases at hand.
Shiites and Kurds will likely be considered protected under the Genocide
Convention because the tribunal has the discretion to interpret what groups are protected.
For example, in Akeysu, the ICTR defined national groups as "a collection of people who
are perceived to share a common legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with
reciprocity of rights and duties."41 Under this definition the Shiites and Kurds would be
considered a national group as they are all Iraqi citizens. Furthermore, the Shiites and
Kurds qualify for protected group status because they have many characteristics that
distinguish them from the other Iraqis.
First, the Shiites, Kurds, and Iraqis do not share a common language. The Shiites
speak Arabic and the Kurds speak Kurdish, while the Iraqis speak Iraqi Arabic which is a
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variation of the classical form of Arabic.42 In addition, most Shiites, Kurds and Iraqis are
Muslim, but they belong to different religious branches of Islam.43 Finally, the Shiites,
Kurds and Iraqis do not share a common culture, as they differ especially in their
traditional dress and customs.44 Representatives of Iraq's Shiite and Kurdish
communities reported to Middle East Watch in 1991 that the Iraqi regime intensified its
deliberate targeting of their cultural and nonpolitical institutions in an attempt to destroy
the fabric of Shiite and Kurdish societies. These attacks were part of what they called a
broader campaign of post-uprising "revenge on a massive scale" in southern and northern
Iraq.45 The regime's retaliatory actions continued a pattern of discrimination by the
Sunni-dominated government against the Shiite and Kurdish religious majorities in Iraq.
Such discrimination includes violations of religious and cultural rights including bans on
publishing contemporary or traditional Shiite and Kurdish written materials, transmitting
radio or television broadcasts with Shiite or Kurdish content, as well as widespread
employment discrimination in Iraq's public sector.46 Considering the differences in
religion and culture between the Shiites, Kurds and the ruling Iraqi population, the
Prosecution can argue that the Shiites and Kurds have protected group status under the
IHT Statute as a stable group whose membership is determined by birth.
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3. Did the perpetrators commit these acts with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the protected
group?
To establish the crime of genocide under the Genocide Convention and the IHT
Statute, the Prosecution must prove that the defendant intended “to destroy, in whole or
in part, a protected group.”47 Whether or not this third element of genocide is proven,
will depend on how the IHT interprets the phrase “in whole or in part.” The Prosecutor
will likely prove this element based on the numerosity of Shiite and Kurdish victims from
the 1991 uprisings.
The ICTR has interpreted the ambiguous phrase “in whole or in part” to mean the
destruction of a considerable number of individuals.48 The ICTY also provides several
cases that have interpreted the phrase “in whole or in part.” In Jelisic, the ICTY held
that “in whole of in part” means “a very large number of the members of a group.”49
While no accurate total count exists of the Iraqi Shiites and Kurds who died in the 1991
uprisings, estimates place this number around 250,000 dead.50 The Prosecution has a
strong argument that the numerosity of Shiite and Kurdish victims satisfies the “in whole
or in part” language of the third element of genocide.
The Genocide Convention and the IHT Statute further require the Prosecution to
prove that the defendants had the intent to destroy a group “in whole or in part.” In
Akayesu, the ICTR held that the offender is only culpable for genocide "when he commits

47
48

See IHT Statute, supra note 2, art. 11 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 40 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

49

Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-10-T P 102 (Dec. 14, 1999) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 18].

50

See Human Rights Watch/Middle East, supra note 15 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
3].

a [prohibited act] with the clear intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular
group."51 The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) further strengthens this position,
which states in its statute that a purposeful intent is required for the crime of genocide.52
While the facts show that the Iraqi Government actually did destroy the Shiites and Kurds
“in whole or in part,” it will be much harder to prove that the government intended to
destroy these groups. Many of the Shiites and Kurds were destroyed when Iraqi troops
suppressed their revolts against the Iraqi Government. The defendants can argue that
they did not intend to destroy the Shiites and Kurds, but were merely protecting
themselves against insurgents similar to the current U.S. and Iraqi treatment of insurgents
in Iraq.
In order to show that the Iraqi Government had a genocidal intent in attacking the
Shiites and Kurds the evidence should include: (1) a showing of the scale and general
nature of the atrocities committed; (2) proof of the discriminatory targeting of the
members or property of one group to the exclusion of other groups; (3) proof of
methodical or systematic planning or killing; (4) the weapons employed and the extent of
bodily injury; (5) documents reflecting participation in or knowledge of atrocities; (6)
derogatory language toward the targeted population; (7) the destruction of a group’s
institutions; and proof of widespread and systematic violence.53
Based on the facts of the 1991 uprisings, the Prosecutor can argue that the intent
of the defendants was to destroy the Shiite and Kurdish populations in retaliation for their
respective rebellions against the Iraqi Government. The previously mentioned discussion
51
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. DOC. A/CONF, 183/9, art. 30 at 87 (1998).
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53
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of numerosity shows the scale of the attacks against the Shiites and Kurds. Furthermore,
massive military operations were undertaken to wipe-out Shiite and Kurdish civilians, not
just insurgents. For example, the helicopter attacks targeted Shiite civilians who were
instructed to migrate north by the Iraqi Government. The use of weapons such as
helicopter gunships, and the extent of killings and bodily injuries to the Shiite and
Kurdish populations show the substantial measures taken to harm them. In addition, the
Iraqi government targeted Shiite and Kurdish institutions in their attacks such as hospitals
and mosques. All of these factors, according to the Kayeshema court, infer intent to
destroy a group.
However, the intent of the defendants will remain shrouded in the lack of
genocidal evidence and mixed motives for the suppression of the 1991 uprisings. There
are many theories for why the Iraqi Government ordered the violent suppression of the
Shiite and Kurdish rebellions to include punishing the rebels, protecting oil fields, and
self-defense.54 In its quest to bring a case of genocide against the Iraqi government
before the International Court of Justice, Human Rights Watch has done extensive
research.55 The organization has found to date, no single master plan to exterminate the
Shiites and Kurds. If the Prosecution has such evidence, it would be helpful in proving
the other intent factors set forth by the Kayeshema court, such as proof of a plan to
destroy the Shiites and Kurds or documents reflecting participation in or knowledge of
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such atrocities.56 The lack of a formal, public campaign to destroy Shiites and Kurds will
make the intent element of genocide difficult to prove for the Prosecution.

ii. Article 12 – Crimes Against Humanity
The IHT has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity under Article 12 of the
IHT Statute.57 For the purposes of the IHT, “crimes against humanity” means:
Any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge
of the attack:
1. Willful Murder
2. Extermination
3. Enslavement
4. Deportation or forcible transfer of population
5. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental norms of international law
6. Torture
7. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity
8. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible
under international law, in connection with any act referred to as a
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity
9. Enforced disappearance of persons
10. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health.58

The IHT statutory language for crimes against humanity is largely based on the
Rome Statute and customary international law. Therefore, precedent from the ICTY and
ICTR may be useful in interpreting Article 12. The ICTY and ICTR provide the
56
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necessary elements to prosecute a person for crimes against humanity: (1) there must be
an attack; (2) the acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack; (3) the attack must be
directed against any civilian population; (4) the attack must be widespread or systematic;
(5) the perpetrator must know that the acts constitute part of a pattern of widespread or
systematic crimes directed against a civilian population and know that the acts fit into
such a pattern.59 All of these elements must be satisfied in order for defendants to be
convicted of crimes against humanity. Typically, crimes against humanity are easier for
Prosecutors to prove that genocide. The difference in standards for genocide and crimes
against humanity is described as follows: “The crime of genocide exists to protect certain
groups from extermination or attempted extermination. The concept of crimes against
humanity exists to protect civilian populations from persecutions.”60 The crime of
genocide is more difficult to prove than crimes against humanity, and it appears the same
theory will hold true in the cases at hand.

1. Was there a prohibited act?
Out of the five cases at hand, three of the cases clearly fulfill the prohibited act
element of crimes against humanity. First, the case in which the Iraqi helicopters
attacked and killed migrating Shiites clearly satisfies the prohibited act of willful murder,
as do the two cases in which Iraqi troops killed men of fighting age by shooting them.
The other two cases do not clearly constitute a prohibited act. One can reasonably infer
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that individuals were killed when Iraqi troops attacked mosques, however, the fact pattern
provided by the IHT does not specify casualties in this specific case. Furthermore, the
case involving the attempted release of chemical warfare does not constitute a prohibited
act since no attack actually occurred.

2. Was the perpetrator part of the act?
The second element for crimes against humanity, that the perpetrator be a part of
the act, is satisfied by proving that a defendant’s actions either caused or aided the
prohibited act.61 Everyone who executed or planned the attacks on the Shiites and Kurds
will satisfy this element. Based on the facts, Iraqi soldiers and officers, to include Ali
Hassan Al Majid and Taha Yassin Ramadan, participated in the attacks on the Shiites and
Kurds.
3. Was the prohibited act directed against a civilian
population?
The third element of crimes against humanity requires that the attack be directed
against a civilian population.62 This requirement is clearly satisfied in the cases at hand.
The fact patterns provided by the IHT specifically state that Shiite and Kurdish civilians
were attacked and killed by the Iraqi government.
Apparently, this element is intended to exclude attacks on soldiers as crimes
against humanity. This requirement affords greater protection to civilians during wars by
confining warfare to military combatants and insurgents. The IHT Statute states that
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crimes against humanity can be committed against “any civilian population,”63 indicating
that a State’s attack on its own citizens is covered by Article 12. In Tadic, the ICTY
discussed the same language in its own statute: "the inclusion of the word 'any' makes it
clear that crimes against humanity can be committed against civilians of the same
nationality as the perpetrator.”64 Therefore, even though the perpetrators, Shiites and
Kurds were all Iraqi citizens, the attacks against them qualify as an attack on a civilian
population.

4. Was the prohibited act widespread or systematic?
Article 12 of the IHT Statute states that crimes against humanity must be
“widespread or systematic.”65 The use of the word “or” means that either “widespread”
or “systematic” actions would suffice, so the terms should be examined separately.
"Widespread" refers to the number of victims, whereas "systematic" refers to the
existence of a policy or plan.66 The requirements for a widespread or systematic attack
are alternative requirements, with each satisfied by the five cases involving violent
attacks against the Shiites and Kurds. The sheer number of victims will likely establish
that the attack was widespread; while the fact that attacks occurred on at least these five
occasions shows that the killings were systematic. According to the facts provided,
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thousands of Shiite and Kurdish civilians died as a direct result of the attacks. In
addition, when viewed collectively, the five episodes of violence against the Shiites and
Kurds indicate that a military plan existed to quell rebellion and exterminate the Shiite
and Kurdish populations in Iraq.

5. Did the perpetrator know the acts constituted part of a
pattern of widespread or systematic crimes against a
civilian population?
The final element of crimes against humanity is the requisite mental state,
or mens rea. Article 12 of the IHT requires “knowledge of the attack.”67 In other
words, the perpetrator must know that his acts are part of larger-scale crimes
against humanity. The only other international tribunal that has a similar mens
rea provision in its statute is the International Criminal Court.68 The IHT and ICC
statutes create ambiguity by adding the mens rea provision. “Knowledge of the
attack” could mean either the perpetrator of a crime against humanity must have
knowledge that his conduct is either a crime or a prohibited act which is part of a
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. For purposes of this
memo, the latter interpretation will be used. Thus, the perpetrator of crimes
against humanity under the IHT Statute must have (1) the requisite mens rea for
the underlying offense and (2) knowledge that his acts make up a smaller part of a
larger “attack” on a civilian population. This interpretation is supported by
Professor Cassese, former president of the ICTY:
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The requisite subjective element or mens rea in crimes against
humanity is not simply limited to the criminal intent (or
recklessness) required for the underlying offence (murder,
extermination, deportation, rape torture, persecution, etc.). The
viciousness of these crimes goes far beyond the underlying offence,
however wicked or despicable it may be. This additional element –
which helps to distinguish between crimes against humanity and
war crimes – consists of awareness of the broader context into
which this crime fits, that is knowledge that the offences are part of
a systematic policy or of widespread and large-scale abuses.69

In addition, both the ICTY and the ICTR support Professor Cassese’s
interpretation. In Tadic, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that "the perpetrator must know of
the broader context in which his act occurs."70 Similarly in Kayishema, the ICTR held
that the mens rea contained two parts; (1) knowledge of the attack and its widespread or
systematic character and (2) awareness of the fact that the criminal activity constitutes
part of the attack.71
In order to successfully convict before the IHT, the prosecutors must prove that
the perpetrators of the five separate attacks on the Shiites and Kurds had (1) purposefully
intended to kill and injure the Shiites and Kurds and (2) had knowledge that the attacks
were part of a systematic policy or of widespread abuses. While the mens rea will be the
hardest element to prove, the prosecutors can draw on the scope of the attacks against the
Shiites and Kurds to show that the Iraqi government knew of the larger plan to persecute
their political opponents.
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iii. Article 13 – War Crimes

Article 13 of the IHT Statute grants the Tribunal jurisdiction over war crimes. In
general, war crimes are prohibited violent acts committed against civilians not involved
in an armed conflict by those who are. War crimes are defined under the IHT Statute as:
1. Grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;72
2. Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international
armed conflict named in the statute;73
3. Attacks on people not taking part in the hostilities during an armed conflict;74 and
4. Serious violations of the laws and customs of war applicable in armed conflict not
of an international character.75
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The base requirement for war crimes is that the prohibited act must have occurred
during an ‘armed conflict.’ Thus, the initial inquiry in determining if a war crime has
taken place must focus on whether or not the prohibited act took place during an armed
conflict.
1. Was an ‘armed conflict’ in progress at the time of
the prohibited act?
The IHT Statute does not expressly define the term ‘armed conflict.’ Most war
crime tribunals have not analyzed the meaning of “armed conflict,’ because the armed
conflict element of a war crime is often obvious and thus easily satisfied. In fact, the
ICTR is one of the only tribunals to provide a working definition of ‘armed conflict.’
The ICTR held that ‘armed conflict’ means “the existence of open hostilities between
armed forces, which are organized to a greater or lesser degree.”76
A few situations have arisen, however, when the existence of an armed conflict
has not been obvious. Under such circumstances, the states involved were responsible
for determining whether or not an armed conflict existed.77 In the event that the existence
of an armed conflict is not obvious, courts must analyze the intensity of violence
occurring in a country at the time of the alleged war crimes.78 If the intensity of violence
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is very high, then the hostilities will likely be considered an armed conflict.79 Under such
a test, even acts of terrorism or small insurgent attacks could amount to an ‘armed
conflict.’80 For example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held that the
killing of 42 civilians by the Argentine military during peacetime was an armed
conflict.81 In addition, a U.S. court held that the hijacking of an airplane during
peacetime was sufficient to satisfy the armed conflict threshold.82
Nor do the Geneva Conventions expressly define the term ‘armed conflict.’
However, the omission of such a definition seems to have been deliberate. At the
Diplomatic Conference that resulted in the composition of the Geneva Conventions of
1949, the issue of what constituted a “case of armed conflict” proved vexing.83 By the
end of the conference, delegates chose not to define ‘armed conflict’ because they did not
want to limit the scope of the term. The delegates deliberately left the term ambiguous so
that “armed conflict” would be subject to multiple interpretations. Thus, an armed
conflict can include hostility ranging from a formal war to a political insurgency.84
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The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions do aid in defining ‘armed
conflict.’85 Article 51(2) of Protocol I (applicable to international armed conflicts)
provides: “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians shall not be the
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread
terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”86 Article 4(d) of Additional
Protocol II (applicable to internal armed conflicts) further provides: “the following acts
against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever….”87 Finally, Article 13 of Additional Protocol II states:
“The Civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians shall not be the object of
attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among
the civilian population are prohibited.”88 The Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions infer that an armed conflict is widespread violence against civilians inflicted
to spread terror.
In the absence of a firm, universally accepted definition of ‘armed conflict,’
scholars have attempted to define the scope of the term. Jean S. Pictet, in his
commentary to the Geneva Conventions, argued that ‘armed conflict’ means “armed
forces on either side engaged in hostilities – conflicts, in short, which are in many
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respects similar to an international war, but take place within the confines of a single
country.”89
In the cases at hand, facts are sufficient to make a determination regarding armed
conflict status. At minimum, open hostilities existed between three groups of people – the
Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. The Shiite and Kurdish rebellions against Saddam Hussein’s
regime in 1991 were hostilities which are widely considered to have been an internal
armed conflict by the rest of the world.

2. Is there a nexus between the prohibited acts and the
armed conflict?
In order to prove war crimes, the next step requires an analysis of whether or not
there is a nexus between the armed conflict and the prohibited acts. This requirement
stems from customary international law. The purpose of such customary international
law is to exclude crimes which are mutually exclusive from an armed conflict. For
example, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (“IMT”) held that the crimes
committed against the European Jews prior to World War II could not be prosecuted by
the IMT as war crimes because the prohibited acts were not related “in execution of, or in
connection with… the war.”90 The IMT held that these same crimes against the Jews
which occurred after World War II commenced could be prosecuted as war crimes,
because the crimes were then sufficiently related to an armed conflict.91
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More recently, the ICTY held in Tadic that prosecution for war crimes requires
that the “offence [was] closely related to the armed conflict as a whole."92 In addition,
the ICTY held in Pavo and Zenga that "[t]here must be an obvious link between the
criminal act and the armed conflict.”93 The ICTR further held:
When the country is in a state of armed conflict, crimes committed
in this period of time could be considered as having been
committed in the context of armed conflict. However, it does not
mean that all such crimes have a direct link with the armed conflict
and all the victims of these crimes are victims of armed conflict.94

In summary, the fact that a prohibited act took place at the same time as an armed
conflict does not automatically mean a war crime occurred. There must be a connection
between the prohibited acts and hostilities that amount to an armed conflict for war
crimes to exist. In the case at hand, the facts indicate that the Iraqi government had a plan
to annihilate the Shiites and Kurds, which was directly linked to the intense hostilities
surrounding the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings in 1991.

3. Was there an internal or international armed
conflict?
Now that the existence of an armed conflict has been established, the next step in
the analysis of war crimes is to determine whether or not the armed conflict was an
international or internal conflict. The IHT Statute stipulates that certain acts are
prohibited during international armed conflicts, while other stipulated acts are prohibited
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during internal armed conflicts.95 The existence of war crimes depends on the type of
armed conflict, since sections (1)-(4) of Article 13 criminalize prohibited acts according
to what type of armed conflict the acts coincide.96 The IHT Statute does not define
‘international’ or ‘internal’ armed conflicts, nor does the Statute differentiate between the
terms.
In 1977, the First Additional Protocol of the Geneva Conventions defined the
terms at issue. Article 1(4) of the First Additional Protocol of the Geneva Conventions
defines ‘international armed conflicts’ as “those between two or more States, or between
a State and a national liberation movement.”97 The Protocol goes on to define ‘internal
armed conflicts’ as “large-scale armed hostilities, other than internal disturbances and
tensions, or riots isolated or sporadic acts of armed violence, between State authorities
and rebels, or between two or more organized armed groups within a State.”98 In the case
at hand, the armed conflict appears to be internal.
Article 13(4) of the IHT Statute stipulates prohibited acts that are exclusive to
“armed conflict not of an international character.”99 Under Article 13(4), the following
acts constitute war crimes if committed during an internal armed conflict:
A.
B.

C.

Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or
against civilian individuals not taking direct part in hostilities;
Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, materials, medical
transportation units and means, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of
the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law;
Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, materials,
units, or vehicles used in humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping missions in
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D.

E.
F.
G.
H.

I.
J.
K.

L.

accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled
to the protection given to civilians or civilian targets under the international
law of armed conflict;
Intentionally directing attacks against buildings that are dedicated to
religious, educational, artistic, scientific or charitable purposes, and historic
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected,
provided they are not military objectives;
Pillaging any town or place, even when taken over by assault;
Committing rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, or any
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
Conscripting or listing children under the age of fifteen years into armed
forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities;
Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the
conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military
reasons so demand;
Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;
Declaring that no person is still alive;
Subjugation persons who are under the power of another party of the conflict
to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind that
are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person
concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, causing death to such person
or persons, or seriously endangering their health; and
Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary, unless such destruction or
seizure is imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict.

The case at hand concerns several of these acts, to include intentionally attacking
persons and buildings. Thus, there was an internal armed conflict during the case at hand
and the prohibited acts were linked to the conflict. Therefore, the actions of those
responsible for the prohibited acts fall neatly into IHT jurisdiction under Article 13 of the
IHT Statute.

4. Did the perpetrator have the requisite mens rea?
The final element of war crimes is the requisite mens rea for the underlying
prohibited acts. The IHT Statute does not require knowledge of the circumstances for
war crimes, unlike the mens rea requirement for crimes against humanity.

iv. Article 14 – Violations of Stipulated Iraqi National Laws
Unlike some other international tribunals, the IHT includes violations of certain
national laws in its jurisdiction. Article 14 of the IHT Statute grants the IHT jurisdiction
over violations of stipulated Iraqi laws.100 Specifically, Article 14 empowers the IHT to
prosecute persons for the following crimes: “First, intervention in the judiciary or the
attempt to influence the functions of the judiciary.101 Second, the wastage and squander
of national resources…102 Third, the abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that
were about to lead to the threat of war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an
Arab country…103 Fourth, if the court finds a default in the elements of any of the crimes
stipulated in Articles 11, 12, 13 of this law, and it is proved to the Court that the act
constitutes a crime punishable by the penal law or any other criminal law at the time of
its commitment, then the court shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate this case.”104
Based on an analysis of the facts of the five attacks on the Shiites and Kurds, the
court will not likely find a violation of Article 14. On the face of the facts at hand, there
is no evidence that members of the former Iraqi government violated any of the stipulated
Iraqi national laws.
v. Article 15 – Who Can be Charged?
The Iraqi High Tribunal has jurisdiction over every natural person whether Iraqi
or non-Iraqi resident of Iraq and accused of the crime of genocide, crimes against
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humanity, war crimes, and violations of certain Iraqi national laws committed between
July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003 in the Republic of Iraq or elsewhere.105 Article 15 of the
IHT Statute further defines who can be held individually responsible for crimes under
IHT jurisdiction.106 Cases before the IHT tend to involve a large number of people, not
just the persons named in the five fact patterns. In order to prosecute all the perpetrators,
the IHT Statute expressly identifies all persons who may be punishable under the
jurisdiction of the IHT.
In addition to criminalizing genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
certain Iraqi national offences, Article 15 makes it a crime to order, solicit, induce,107 aid,
abet,108 contribute to,109 or attempt to commit any of the above listed crimes.110
Additionally, Article 15 removes head-of-state immunity and any other special treatment
regarding criminal responsibility for any member of the Iraqi government.111 Article 15
adopts the doctrine of ‘superior responsibility’112 and removes the ‘following orders’
defense.113 Thus, Article 15 prohibits passing off liability from superiors to subordinates
and vice versa.
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As a result, everyone involved in the crimes against Shiites and Kurds, ranging from
the soldiers to the senior government officials, may be charged if their participation
amounts to a crime under Articles 11 through 15.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Of the crimes the IHT has jurisdiction over, the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes likely occurred in the five cases at hand. Genocide likely
occurred because the Iraqi government targeted protected groups with the intent to
destroy them, in whole or in part. Crimes against humanity likely occurred because the
Iraqi government committed both systematic and widespread attacks on civilian
populations. Additionally, war crimes likely occurred because the attempted use of
chemical weapons over a large city during an internal armed conflict constitutes a war
crime. Charges under Articles 11 through 13 of the IHT Statute should be sustainable
against those who were involved in the attacks and attempted attacks against the Shiites
and Kurds.
Crimes under Article 14 of the IHT Statute are least likely to have occurred
during the five episodes. The five incidents do not fall under the specific crimes
stipulated in Article 14. Thus, charges under Article 14 for violations of certain Iraqi
national laws would probably not result in convictions.
Finally, everyone involved in the five acts of violence against the Shiites and
Kurds, ranging from the military troops to the senior members of the regime, may be
charged if their participation amounted to committing, ordering, soliciting, inducing,

aiding, abetting, contributing to, or attempting to commit a crime within the jurisdiction
of the IHT.
In sum, the five cases at hand probably constitute crimes under Articles 11
(genocide), 12 (crimes against humanity), 13 (war crimes), and 15 (criminal liability) of
the IST Statute, but probably not under Article 14 (certain Iraqi laws).
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